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Network Rail\'s GSM-R masts

Network Rail's GSM-R masts

ERTMS (the European Rail Traffic Management System) is an ambitious scheme for a Europe-wide computer-controlled rail management system comprising two principal components: ATP (which, like TPWS, prevents trains from passing signals set at danger) and ETCS, which automates the flow of rail traffic). Data commmunication via GSM-R-based radio is required for some versions of ERTMS. (See a brief description of the various types.

Three main reasons for implementing ERTMS are given: safety, interoperability, and capacity/performance. Let's look at these in turn:

Safety - as both Railway Safety and the Strategic Rail Authority concede, the additional margin of safety provided by ERTMS is trivial and not worth the vast expenditure.

Interoperability - interoperability in the original sense does not apply to the UK, since the only UK lines and trains that might cross borders are exempt from ERTMS. Interoperability in the new sense, of common standards and multi-source procurement, may be of benefit once standards have been fixed - but Network Rail is wilfully throwing away that advantage by pioneering an advanced version of ERTMS that no other country has attempted.

Capacity/performance - The option chosen by Network Rail “is estimated to potentially increase capacity by up to 10% with complementary investment”. A possible capacity increase of up to 10% with complementary investment (that is, one assumes, with extra unspecified expenditure) seems a very dubious return for such a massive high-risk venture.

Could there possibly be a fourth reason - to save money by making drivers and signallers redundant? At some time in the future, it could even be possible that all UK rail traffic would be controlled from a data centre in Bangalore!

Almost everyone in this country will suffer to some extent from Network Rail's GSM-R masts, even if it's "only" by having a favourite view spoilt.

Network Rail justify the masts using two proven propaganda techniques:

  • Scaremongering - implying that rail passengers' lives will be put at risk if Network Rail's plans are thwarted.
  • It's all Brussels' fault - Network Rail is merely following the dictates of our European masters.

Neither of these claims is true.

Network Rail’s main weapons are stealth and fear: residents don’t get to hear of their plans until the last minute, then panic and try to pass the parcel on to some other community.

This divide and rule strategy will only work if there is no co-ordinated campaign against the whole project.

The evidence we've uncovered shows that much of Network Rail's rationale is deeply flawed.

If the public at large get to hear about what's afoot, and make their concerns known to the powers-that-be, the chances are that the whole project will be replaced by something more sensible, cheaper, and less intrusive.

See how you can help.

Network Rail claim that the new network has to be based on GSM-R technology. But GSM-R does not necessarily require masts (let alone 33-metre masts): other, less obtrusive, technologies may be used.

One from the same manufacturer, Siemens, is called the leaky feeder cable or Euroloop. On their website Siemens say that the leaky cable works under water, under snow, and under dust. London Underground and the Severn Tunnel have used leaky cable for years, as have the Swiss. Network Rail stated to the Tarka Action Group that leaky cable is a viable alternative system after all, which could be used instead of masts along the Tarka Line.

The other GSM-R-compatible solution uses satellite technology. Several GSM-over-IP (Internet Protocol) implementations are available, and satellite links can (and do) carry internet traffic (see below), so it would not be difficult to interconnect the existing GPS satellite system with GSM-R.

However, the European Union is creating its own satellite network, called Galileo, which is specifically intended to link-up with ERTMS (particularly the European Train Control System component). According to the section of the Galileo website devoted to rail applications, “The introduction of satellite navigation within the ETCS/ERTMS will… contribute to increase the performance on the high-density line[s] and lower the cost on low density and regional lines.”

Galileo uses 30 satellites, distributed over three planes in Medium Earth Orbit, “which ensures a uniform performance both in terms of accuracy and availability. Unlike GPS, it will be possible to receive Galileo in towns and in regions located in extreme latitudes.” Galileo is scheduled to offer an operational service from 2008 onwards - that is, at least seven years before ERTMS becomes operational in the UK.

But both have disadvantages, according to Network Rail (who obviously don't consider the disfigurement of our countryside with masts a 'disadvantage').

In the words of John Armitt, Network Rail's Chief Executive, in a letter to Dr Caroline Jackson, an MEP for the south-west: “The two basic altemative technologies capable of delivering GSM-R standard communications have considerable drawbacks. First, satellite technology is expensive and does not provide a solution for tunnels, cuttings and highly built-up areas. The second option, leaky feeder cable, is equally if not more expensive and poses real operational issues in terms of the amount of lineside installation required.”

A combination of the two technologies could well be the solution. Leaky feeder cable is particularly suited to tunnels and cuttings, and satellite could handle (most of) the rest.

Regarding the problem of using satellite technology in “highly built-up areas”: the press release on the Strategic Rail Authority's website (cited earlier) says, in item 7 of the Notes to Editors, “A particular challenge for the UK will be delivering the system in busy commuter and mixed traffic areas, where a technical review of the workings of the GSM-R mobile communications network has highlighted a lack of capacity and resilience as a major technical risk. Currently nowhere in Europe is anyone understood to be planning to implement ERTMS in this type of rail environment, which is common in the UK.”

A recent report on the weaknesses of GSM-R in such environments can be found in an article called Rail comms system could delay trains.

Another, and much cheaper, solution would be for Network Rail to make use of the existing mobile phone network for cab-to-signaller voice communications, with a much smaller number of additional masts to fill in gaps in the existing coverage, and satellite technology for ERTMS-related data communications. As mentioned previously, the Cullen Report was quite favourable towards the use of standard mobile phones by drivers and conductors.

Providing uninterrupted coverage to rail passengers is something of a Holy Grail for mobile phone operators. One or more operators would almost certainly be willing to provide Network Rail and the rail operators with secure in-cab communications at a heavily subsidised price in return for Network Rail's cooperation.

The Tyne and Wear Metro provides one example - Nexus, the Passenger Transport Executive that operates the service, cooperated with the four main mobile operators to install microcells (small antennae) on the network, giving passengers continuous mobile reception. According to an article on the project, “Nexus said that the technology provides additional safety capabilities, allowing train drivers and station staff to make calls to emergency services and control centres.” According to another article, Orange is working "in partnership with the necessary rail authorities" to provide mobile reception in tunnels on the East Coast, West Coast, and Great Western lines.

From another direction, GNER is planning to install Wi-Fi networks on its rolling stock - according to a BBC article, “Satellite dishes on the trains will connect to a variety of networks along the route, including digital TV connections and mobile base stations.” Virgin are planning something similar to offset the bad reception caused by the silvered windows of their new Pendolino trains.

ip.access is a Cambridge-based company that specialises in providing GSM and G3 access over IP (the internet protocol) using 'nanocells' - tiny antennae the size of a Smartie packet. IP is satellite-compatible, so a directional dish on top of the train could pick up mobile communications signals and distribute them throughout the train. A version of their system is operational on the Kiev Metro. There's more information here. Similar GSM-over-IP technology has been developed by Sweden's Telia Bright.

The most compelling reasons Network Rail's Head of Communications, GSM-R Project, could adduce for not using third-party masts are that “the GSM-R network will be a key element of our operational safety apparatus and as such, the masts will be dedicated to this use to minimise any operational risk. Particularly in sparsely populated areas mobile coverage is poor and masts tend not be in the right places for our intended purpose.” We imagine that most people would trust Vodafone or Orange, or almost anyone else, to manage a communications network better than Network Rail. And erecting new masts to fill in the gaps in coverage would be vastly cheaper and less disruptive than building a whole new network, and could be implemented far more quickly. Unfortunately, it seems that Network Rail is institutionally averse to cooperation - see Whatever happened to DART?

And communications technology is advancing all the time. GSM-R, which is based on GSM technology developed in the 1980s and standardised in 1991, is already obsolescent, overtaken by G3, and G3 in turn is threatened by several alternative technologies.

Here's a quotation from the Final Report on West Coast Route Modernisation to the Office of the Rail Regulator, published in June 2000:

The GSM system is being superseded by the third generation mobile telephone system (UMTS [G3]). Although one telecoms operator has stated that it will not guarantee GSM beyond 2009, it is likely that GSM-R will not become technologically obsolescent for about 15 years, by which time the systems would in any case be life-expired.

West Coast Route Modernisation, Report to Office of the Rail Regulator, Booz Allen & Hamilton, June 2000, Section 3.58 (949kb PDF)

15 years from the date of publication takes us up to 2015 - which is the earliest date that ERTMS can be implemented. (See Delays?).

The committee of the UIC International Union of Railways that developed the GSM-R standard is well aware that GSM-R is in its twilight years. Here is a rather tetchy and defensive quote from the FAQ page on their GSM-R website:

Of course, there might be better solutions in theory today if we were starting again. But we're not. GSM-R is today's mobile communications system for the railways. The objective was to find a solution that meets the railways' overall requirements (economically and technically). GSM-R is this solution.... In any case, if we were to start from scratch now we would embrace other possible solutions in the study [our emphasis] - software radio for instance or UMTS [G3].

Bearing in mind that GSM-R is only required by ERTMS Level 2, that the UK is the first (and so far the only) EU country to commit to implementing ERTMS Level 2 on all its track, and that the UK timetable for implementation has been constantly deferred, by the time GSM-R is brought into operation the technology it's based on will be 20 years old or more. “Starting from scratch now” sounds like an excellent idea (though it may still be slightly premature!).

Another promising technology is stratospheric broadband using High Altitude Platforms (unmanned airships or solar-powered gliders flying at an altitude of around 20 kilometres - well above normal aircraft but substantially below orbiting satellites), which has much higher capacity than satellite but doesn't require the masts needed by terrestrial networks, and is cheaper than either. One application the developers consider ideal for this technology is high-bandwidth communication with moving trains using directional antennae.

There's more about the Capanina project (which is EU-funded) here.

here is very widespread and serious public concern over the adverse health effects of long-term exposure to low-intensity microwaves. These are implicated in a variety of ailments, including leukaemia and brain tumours.

Network Rail, supported by Government experts, insist that the emissions pose no threat to anybody. However, public confidence in Government experts is not what it was. After all, we were told not long ago that there was no risk from using mobile phones. Now we are told we should use them sparingly, and children should not use them at all.

The Government has recently adopted the guidelines issued by ICNIRP (International Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection), which are somewhat more stringent than the earlier UK standard. However, in the ICNIRP Guidelines it is stated on the third page that:

“...these guidelines are based on short-term, immediate health effects such as stimulation of peripheral nerves and muscles, shocks and burns caused by touching conducting objects, and elevated tissue temperatures resulting from absorption of energy during exposure to EMF. In the case of potential long-term effects of exposure, such as an increased risk of cancer, ICNIRP concluded that available data are insufficient to provide a basis for setting exposure restrictions....”

Guidelines for Limiting Exposure to Time-Varying Electric, Magnetic, and Electromagnetic Fields (a 612 kilobyte PDF)

In other words, the guidelines are not applicable to circumstances where people are exposed to emissions twenty-four hours a day, every day of the year, for years on end. The guidleines are also rather old (published 1998), and a great deal of research has taken place since.

In any case, there are legal precedents supporting the view that Genuine public fear and concern is a material planning consideration that needs to be taken into account by planners (regardless of the views of the authorities and the scientific establishment), and supporting the conclusion of the Stewart Report (May 2000) that a precautionary approach should be taken.

This is not such a strange principle: the public's concern about rail safety, compared with the safety of other forms of transport, clearly is not rational, but politicians, bureaucrats, and even the judiciary treat it with the greatest respect.

Read a good briefing paper on the legal and health aspects of radio masts.

There is particular concern in the case of children, who are known to be more vulnerable than adults.

A guideline that is often quoted, and is observed by many planning authorities, is that no mobile phone mast should be within 500 metres of a dwelling. But planning authorities have no say with Network Rail's masts.

An excellent article on the health risks of mobile phone masts, written from an initially sceptical point-of-view, was published in an article in The Guardian on April 10 2004. More information on the subject can be found in this section of the Mast Sanity Website.

See a good summary of the data specifically related to GSM-R masts (MS Word).

Network Rail claim that they are obliged to introduce a GSM-R network covering all their track by a European Union law (Directive 96/48).

Directive 96/48/EC has been incorporated in UK law by Statutory Instrument 2002 No 1166, The Railways (Interoperability) (High-Speed) Regulations 2002. Relevant documents can be found on the Department for Transport website (in HTML, PDF, and Word).

The GSM-R network is mandated by the European Union for so-called TEN routes, and also for lines that cross or share track with TEN routes. TEN stands for Trans-European Network, a term first used in the Treaty of Rome Article 129b to cover a wide variety of networks, including road, ferry, and communications. The term is not used in Council Directive 96/48/EC - the expression high-speed lines (defined basically as lines equipped for speeds of 200 kph or more - that is, 125+ mph) is used instead.

A similar Directive on the interoperability of the conventional, ie non-high-speed, trans-European rail system came into force in April 2001 (Directive 2001/16/EC).

There are four TEN routes in the UK mainland: the Channel Tunnel Rail Link and the part of the Channel Tunnel that falls within UK jurisdiction, the West and East Coast Main Lines, and the Great Western Main Line between London and Bristol/Cardiff.

In the Treaty of Rome, and in the Directives themselves, 'interoperability' meant what most people would understand by the term - that is, the ability for trains from one EU country to run on tracks in another. Both Directives are summarised on this EU Web page. Here is a quote from it (our emphasis):

The objective of these two directives is to narrow down the divide so that international trains can provide a better, completely safe service when they change national networks.

Here's another quote from the home page of the European Rail Traffic Management System:

Over the past decade, industrial giants and European governments have strived to attain rail interoperability, so that trains can cross borders without stopping.

Indeed, the standard letter sent by Network Rail to notify residents of a planned mast states that the purpose of the European directive is "to ensure that trains can safely travel from one country to another".

Increasingly, however, interoperability is construed as standardisation, regardless of whether any cross-border traffic will ever occur. The benefits of interoperability in this sense, the EU believes, will come from “more open, competitive procurement”.

However, the team responsible for ERTMS implementation in the UK clearly aren't interested in such savings: “To those rail pundits who advocate buying standard ERTMS products 'off the European shelf', the ERTMS team have a simple response - not just yet!” This comes from the December 2003 issue of ERTMS news, (160KB PDF) from the SRA's website. Clearly, it would be more sensible to say not just yet to ERTMS! Fairly typically, the file name, ERTMSNewsletterJan03.pdf, is somewhat misleading! Here's another very worrying quote from the ERTMS team:

Level 2 [of ERTMS, the version Network Rail is opting for] is still being developed and tested throughout the EC on pilot lines. Economic viability, standards development and ownership, certified product availability and funding are all areas currently under discussion at European level.

The Health and Safety Executive report, Train Protection - Review of economic aspects of the work of the ERTMS Programme, also talks of “the dangers of a British ERTMS which is so different from continental design that many supply-chain benefits are lost”.

So Network Rail, by pioneering this technology, is throwing away its one possible advantage to the UK - "more open, competitive procurement" for standardised products! Have they learnt nothing from the WCML modernisation programme?

The standards applying to TEN routes are broken down into a number of areas or sub-systems, including rolling stock, infrastructure, maintenance, etc; the sub-system under which GSM-R falls is control-command and signalling. For each sub-system, there is or will be a Technical Specification for Interoperability (TSI).

It is possible to gain 'derogation' (ie exemption) from one or more provisions of any TSI. However, derogation from one provision does not in itself entail derogation from any other provision.

It is also possible to apply for derogation on the grounds of cost. The budgeted cost of the GSM-R network itself is £171 million (Supplementary Information to the 2000 NMS, page 24 - see above), but the primary reason for implementing it (rather than a simpler, cheaper, less intrusive alternative) is that it also forms the infrastructure for ERTMS (see above). ERTMS is currently (May 2004) budgeted to cost £4.28 billion. The Strategic Rail Authority is distinctly tepid about ERTMS's contribution to safety (see above) and is also dubious about the operational performance gains that ERTMS is supposed to bring (the SRA regards its "lack of capacity and resilience as a major technical risk").

Has Network Rail, or the Department for Transport, sought exemption from the control-command and signalling TSI?

The answer is “Yes”, but only in respect of one UK line - and the one line that is exempt is (believe it or not!) the Channel Tunnel Rail Link, because it has to be compatible with the Channel Tunnel, which itself uses a non-GSM-R signalling system. This extraordinary fact appears on the Strategic Rail Authority's website. A written answer from the EU to Caroline Jackson, MEP for the South-West, confirms it: the only section of rail for which the UK has sought derogation from European railway interoperability standards is the only section of UK rail that interoperates with European railways.

In Clause 7 of the Regulatory Impact Assessment (also on the DfT website) it is stated that:

It is important to note that the Directive does not require works to comply with the TSIs to be undertaken; the obligations only arise when projects to build new high-speed lines, or to upgrade them for high-speed, are undertaken.

Since all the UK TEN lines have been high-speed routes (ie capable of handling speeds of 125mph and above) for quite a long time, another question is: what's forcing Network Rail to comply with the TSI now?

Here's a quotation from an excellent article called ERTMS: can it be made cost-effective?, published in the July 2004 issue of Modern Railways:

Up here in our little offshore island, where interoperability is not a practical issue, there is a tendency to assume that all the European railways are mad keen for ERTMS. They are not.
DB (German Rail) has taken the line that ERTMS brings no domestic benefit so that if European law decrees its fitment, Europe can pay. According to informed sources, the head of SNCB (Belgium Railways) described ERTMS as 'developed by subalterns, with no leadership, no business case and no migration strategy'.

According to the December 2003 issue of ERTMS news (see above), Italy plans to use Level 2 ERTMS on new high speed lines only, and neither France nor Germany have firm dates for implementing it at all. They obviously have more sense than to pioneer an unproven committee-designed technology on this scale! Only Austria and Bulgaria are said to have implemented Level 1 (a simpler version of) ERTMS.

If the EU really did intend to enable all trains in all countries to operate on all tracks, the costs involved would be staggering: the 'loading gauge' used varies from country to country, and the UK in particular is different from the others; in fact, the UK is exempt from the TEN loading gauge standards. (“The railway loading gauge is a series of height and width profiles above the rail tracks that govern the physical dimensions of a railway vehicle” - source: Highways Agency Guide to Freight.) Continental rolling stock is taller and (in the case of freight wagons) wider than UK rolling stock, and British platforms are much higher than the continental equivalent. Many of Britain's canopies, overhead power supplies, bridges, tunnels, etc, and all of our station platforms, would have to be replaced or modified to accommodate standard continental rolling-stock, while passengers on UK trains in Europe would have to jump up or down to get on or off at stations.

In any case, trains couldn't get safely from one side of the Channel to the other by rail, since their new GSM-R technology wouldn't work on the Rail Link or in the Channel Tunnel itself.